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Socio-Economic Review 2004 2(3):415-424; doi:10.1093/soceco/2.3.415
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© Oxford University Press and the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics 2004. All rights reserved.

Market constraints, economic performance and political power: modernizers versus leftists

Euclid Tsakalotos1

Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, 76 Patission St, Athens 104 34, Greece

Correspondence: tsakalotos{at}aueb.gr

This paper extends Wright's critique of Streeck's "Beneficial Constraints" paper to show why noncapitalist groups may rationally oppose deregulation even when constraints are beyond the level necessary for optimal economic performance. Starting from a point of "excessive" regulation, a move towards a state which is superior both in terms of economic efficiency and equity (defined as a redistribution in favour of the least well-off within the noncapitalist group) may not constitute a stable equilibrium once relations of power are considered. Under plausible assumptions further deregulation may be hard to resist to the detriment of both insiders and outsiders within the noncapitalist block. In this context opposition to liberal reforms is neither irrational nor necessarily bowing to "sectional" interest groups.

Key Words: neo-liberalism • structural reforms • institutional economies • JEL classification: P1, P16, P17


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